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Summary
Background: Animals prefer small over large rewards
when the delays preceding large rewards exceed an
individual tolerance limit. Such impulsive choice beha-
vior occurs even in situations in which alternative stra-
tegies would yield more optimal outcomes. Behavioral
research has shown that an animal’s choice is guided
by the alternative rewards’ subjective values, which are
a function of reward amount and time-to-reward. De-
spite increasing knowledge about the pharmacology
and anatomy underlying impulsivity, it is still unknown
how the brain combines reward amount and time-
to-reward information to represent subjective reward
value.
Results: We trained pigeons to choose between small,
immediate rewards and large rewards delivered after
gradually increasing delays. Single-cell recordings in
the avian Nidopallium caudolaterale, the presumed
functional analog of the mammalian prefrontal cortex,
revealed that neural delay activation decreased with
increasing delay length but also covaried with the ex-
pected reward amount. This integrated neural response
was modulated by reward amount and delay, as pre-
dicted by a hyperbolical equation, of subjective reward
value derived from behavioral studies. Furthermore, the
neural activation pattern reflected the current reward
preference and the time point of the shift from large to
small rewards.
Conclusions: The reported activity was modulated by
the temporal devaluation of the anticipated reward in
addition to reward amount. Our findings contribute to
the understanding of neuropathologies such as drug
addiction, pathological gambling, frontal lobe syn-
drome, and attention-deficit disorders, which are char-
acterized by inappropriate temporal discounting and
increased impulsiveness.*Correspondence: tobias.kalenscher@ruhr-uni-bochum.deIntroduction
Impulsive choice—that is, the preference for a small,
immediate reward over a large, delayed one—is a key
element in a wide range of pathological behaviors, such
as drug addiction, pathological gambling, attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and prefrontal dysfunc-
tion. The crucial deficit seems to involve a reduced sen-
sitivity to delayed response outcomes in relation to
immediate ones [1–3]. Although knowledge about the
pharmacology and neuroanatomy of impulsiveness is
expanding, its neural basis is still poorly understood
[1–9].
A range of classic psychological studies on impulsive
choice behavior of pigeons reveals that the preference
for small, immediate or large, delayed rewards is deter-
mined by their relative subjective reward values. The
subjective value of a reward is not only a function of its
amount, but is also inversely proportional to the delay
between response and reward [8, 10–13]. Mazur [11]
described the relation between reward value, amount,
and delay-to-reward with a function in which the sub-
jective value of a reward decreases hyperbolically with
increasing delay duration:
V =
A
1 + gD
(1)
where V is the subjective reward value, A is the fixed
reward amount, D is the delay, and γ is a discount factor
that describes the individually different impact of delay
on reward value and determines the slope of the de-
cay function.
This equation describes how time-to-reward and re-
ward amount are combined into subjective reward
value. Numerous studies indicate that single units in the
mammalian orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex process the constituents of this com-
putation; that is, neurons provide the neural mechanism
for the estimation of interval time [14], their activity can
be modulated by the amount of an expected reward
[15, 16], and they encode the relative reward value [17].
However, the neural mechanisms by which reward
amount and time-to-reward are combined and translated
into subjective reward value are unknown.
To address this issue, we trained pigeons to choose
between a small, immediate reward and a large reward
that was initially delivered after the same short delay
but was delayed further as the session progressed.
This schedule resulted in a typical within-session pref-
erence shift (PS) from the large (delayed) to the small
(immediate) reward. We examined single-neuron activ-
ity in the Nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) and related
the neural responses to the animals’ reward preference.
The NCL is a pallial multimodal association structure
that is suggested to be functionally equivalent to the
mammalian prefrontal cortex [18–21] and has recently
been related to the temporal organization of choice
behavior [22]. Note that the NCL was named Neostria-
tum caudolaterale prior to the revision of the nomencla-
ture [21].
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rate delay-to-reward and reward-amount information to
represent subjective reward value as expressed in
Equation 1. More precisely, if single neurons are indeed
modulated by subjective reward value, then according
to Equation 1, the following hypotheses about the ac-
tivity of single units involved in the processing of sub-
jective reward value should hold:
(1) For constant delays and reward amounts across
several trials, the subjective reward value and,
hence, neural activity should remain constant.
(2) For constant reward amounts but increasing delays,
the subjective reward value decays. Accordingly,
neural activity of the same neuron should decrease
with increasing delay.
(3) For constant delays but different reward amounts
(reward A > B), the subjective value of reward A is
larger than the value of reward B. Consequently,
neural activity related to the choice of reward A
should be higher than activity related to B.
In this article, we report that single neurons in the
NCL show evidence of integrating reward amount and
delay-to-reward information. We conclude that their
activity was modulated by subjective reward value, as
predicted by these hypotheses. Furthermore, the integ-
rated neural response covaried with the time point of
the preference shift from large, delayed rewards to
small, immediate ones.
Results
Procedure
Eight pigeons were trained in the delayed-reward
choice paradigm depicted in Figure 1. They had the
choice between two pecking keys associated with dif-
ferent reward amounts and delay times. A fixed ratio
response on one key led to a small reward (2 s access
to food) that was delivered after a fixed short delay (al-
ways 1.5 s between response and delivery), and a fixed
ratio response on the other key resulted in a large re-
ward (4 s access to food) that was also delivered after
1.5 s at the beginning of a session. As the session pro-
gressed, however, the delay preceding the large reward
was increased successively in a blockwise fashion in
individually different increments. The increments were
determined for each pigeon separately to account for
interindividual differences in impulsiveness (see the
Supplemental Data available with this article online for
details).
Behavioral Performance
The pigeons showed a within-session PS (defined as
the blocki in which the large reward is chosen inR50%
of the trials, whereas it is chosen in <50% of the trials
in blocki+1) that is typical for this design. Figure 2A
shows a representative example of the animals’ beha-
vior in one single session. This pigeon predominantly
chose the large reward when the delay was small, but
once the delay exceeded an individual tolerance limit,
its preference shifted to the small, short-delayed re-
ward. This biased preference pattern was confirmed by
the group data of the three PS-preceding and the threePS-following blocks, averaged across all animals and
aligned to each individual PS (Figure 2B). Note that the
three PS-preceding blocks will be labeled –3, –2, and
–1 in relation to individual PS occurrence throughout
this paper unless otherwise stated; accordingly, the
three blocks following the PS will be labeled 1, 2, and 3.
In general, there was large interindividual variability
in the maximum delay tolerance because some pigeons
were more impulsive than others (see Table S1). The
mean PS occurred between the third and fourth block,
and the mean maximum delay tolerance (DT) was 10.4 s
(standard error of the mean: 0.8; range: 1.5–48 s).
Neurons Show Delay Activity Related
to Reward Anticipation
We recorded single-unit activity from 159 NCL neurons.
One hundred fourteen cells showed significantly in-
creased activity in reward anticipation during the delay
period (71.7%, all p < 0.05, paired t test; for details on
further task-related activations, refer to Supplemental
Data). Figure 3A displays a representative neuron with
sustained delay activity. Typically, these units showed
an initial short phasic peak at delay onset and then
gradually increased their activity until it stabilized at a
final level.
To compare the level of the sustained response acti-
vation across the blocks, we examined the ranked per-
cent change of delay activity in a time window of 1000–
1500 ms after delay onset as a measure of activation
magnitude—that is, toward the end of the maximum
delay duration that all conditions had in common and
where the final level of delay activity had already been
reached (see gray area in Figure 3).
Selection of Neurons of Interest
We hypothesized the existence of single units that en-
code the subjective reward value as a function of delay
length and reward amount. The hypotheses outlined
above allowed derivation of quantitative predictions of
expected neural-activity pattern. We selected units of
interest from all sustained delay units if they met the
following criteria:
(1) Before PS: A−3 > A−2 > A−1 with A−3 >> A−1
(2) After PS: A1 y A2 y A3
where Ai is the mean activation magnitude in the in-
dexed block. “>>” was defined as “a difference larger
than two standard errors,” and “y” was defined as
“within the range of one standard error.”
Of the 114 neurons with sustained delay activity, 22
had to be excluded prior to criterion testing because
pigeons showed no or no definite PS in the recorded
session. Of the remaining 92 units, 14 (15.22%) met
these criteria.
It was necessary to show that the probability of a
false-positive detection was < 0.05 to reject the hypoth-
esis that our criteria were met by chance. We therefore
performed a bootstrap analysis to determine the likeli-
hood of detecting 14 out of 92 neurons whose activity
pattern was task unrelated and fully random [23]. The
analysis was done for each of the 92 neurons sepa-
rately by reassigning each neural response during the
delay and the baseline phase to a randomly selected
Current Biology
596Figure 1. Delayed-Reward Choice Task
Sequence of intervals within a trial (A) and
block design (B). Each trial started with a
baseline (BSL) interval, followed by a cue
phase (CUE). By responding on one of the
two keys during the RESPONSE phase (RE),
pigeons chose between a small, short-delayed
REWARD (REW) and a large reward preceded
by increasing DELAYS (DEL, incremented in
individually different steps). Total trial length
within one session was always constant and
independent of choice and variations of de-
lay and reward times. The length of the in-
tertrial interval (ITI) was individually adjusted
on a trial-by-trial basis depending on delay
and reward duration. A session consisted of
a succession of a varying number of blocks
of 16 trials, including the first two trials,
which were forced choice trials (1 × large,
delayed and 1 × small, short-delayed reward
in randomized order). Delays preceding large
rewards were increased between the blocks.
A session was terminated three blocks after
a PS or after a maximum of ten blocks (note
that this figure displays a session of six
blocks).trial with a uniformly distributed randomizer. After reas- v
tsignment, the activation-magnitude pattern was com-
puted as described above. This was done for every a
0neuron, and we determined how many of the 92 shuf-
fled data sets met our criteria. This was repeated 1000 n
ttimes. Across the 1000 repetitions, our criteria were met
on average in 3.81 cases (± 0.06 SEM, 4.1%), and 14 c
3hits (15.22%) were met in none of the 1000 draws. The
probability of false-positively detecting 14 out of 92 S
aneurons was therefore p < 0.001. We concluded that
the observed data pattern far exceeded what would m
ahave been expected by chance.
a
rSingle Neuron Activity Is Modulated
cby Time-to-Reward and Reward Amount
Figure 3 shows an example of a neuron that met the
pabove criteria. The mean firing rate of this unit shows
rthat, when the pigeon chose the large reward before
sthe PS (Figure 3A), the level of sustained delay activity
pwas maximal in block –3, in which the delay was mini-
fmal, and decreased across the blocks as the delay pre-
Iceding large rewards increased. In small-reward trials
rafter the PS (blocks 1 to 3, in which small rewards were
tdelivered after an invariantly short delay; Figure 3B), the
1same neuron showed no evidence of a systematic vari-
lation in discharge rates across the blocks. Hence, this
sunit’s activity was modulated by the duration of the
idelay.
rStatistical analysis of the population response on the
basis of all cells (Figure 4A) confirmed that neural acti- sation magnitude indeed significantly decayed across
he PS-preceding blocks (only large-reward choices;
ctivation in block −3 > block −2 > block −1; all p <
.01; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Moreover, there was
o significant difference in activation magnitude be-
ween the blocks after the PS (only small-reward
hoices; block 1 versus block 2, block 1 versus block
, and block 2 versus block 3; all p > 0.2; Kolmogorov-
mirnov test). Thus, consistent with our first hypothesis
nd our selection criteria, the neural response rate re-
ained unchanged across trials when delay and
mount were both invariant (post-PS blocks 1 to 3),
nd, consistent with our second hypothesis, the neural
esponse rate decreased with increasing delay and
onstant reward amount (pre-PS blocks −3 to −1).
The analysis reveals, on the one hand, that the re-
orted units adjusted their response rate to interval du-
ation. On the other hand, this explanation alone is in-
ufficient to fully capture the observed response
attern, as shown by the comparison of trials that dif-
ered only in reward amount and not in delay duration.
f neural responses were solely modulated by delay du-
ation, one would expect no difference between the ac-
ivation in post-PS trials (small reward, short delay of
.5 s) and block –3, in which the delay preceding the
arge reward was likewise 1.5 s (large reward, same
hort delay). However, we found that large reward activ-
ty in block –3 was significantly higher than the small
eward activity in all post-PS blocks (only the eight ses-
ions in which the delay in block –3 was 1.5 s; see Sup-
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(A) Example of delay-dependent preference for large rewards of one pigeon. This pigeon preferred the large reward until the individual delay-
tolerance limit (DT) of 7 s was reached, then shifted its preference and went on to almost exclusively opt for the small, short-delayed reward.
The x axis depicts delay combinations (in s) as well as the absolute and relative block numbers with regard to PS occurrence.
(B) Mean large-reward choice frequency (± SEM), averaged across all sessions and pigeons and aligned to each individual preference shift
(only the three blocks preceding and following the individual PS are displayed). Sessions with lacking or unclear PS were excluded from the
group data.
(C) Percentage, shown for each trial in block –1, of sessions in which pigeons chose the large reward (calculated from the 14 sessions in
which the neurons of interest were recorded). The frequency of large-reward choices decreased significantly across the trials (regression
analysis). Such a trial-dependent decrease in choice frequency was not observed in any of the other blocks. The preference shift starts at
about trial number eight. The fact that it did not occur immediately at the beginning of the block presumably results from the fact that pigeons
needed to sample the current delay/reward-amount configuration for some trials before changing the preference bias.plemental Data; activity in block –3 versus block 1,
block 2, and block 3; all p < 0.01; Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test; Figure 4B). Therefore, delay duration alone cannot
fully account for the variation in response magnitude;
instead, the cells additionally encoded reward amount.
This conclusion is consistent with the third hypothesis,
which states that for identical delay durations, the mag-
nitude of the neural activity related to large-reward
choices should be higher than activity related to small-
reward choices.
The Relative Activation Magnitude Correlates
with the Pigeons’ Preference for the Large,
Delayed or Small, Immediate Reward
Most interestingly, we found that changes in the neural
activity pattern coincided with the occurrence of the
PS: The activation related to large-reward choices in
block –3 was significantly higher than the activation of
small-reward choices in all post-PS blocks (block –3
versus all post-PS blocks; all p < 0.001; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test), whereas the activation in block –2 did
not significantly differ from any of the post-PS blocks
(block –2 versus all post-PS blocks; all p > 0.44; Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov test). Block –1 was the first block in
which the large-reward-related response magnitudesignificantly dropped below the activation magnitude
related to the small-reward choices (block –1 versus all
post-PS blocks; all p < 0.05; Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests).
A detailed behavioral analysis of the choice distribu-
tion within each block revealed that the PS actually oc-
curred within block –1, in which the frequency of large-
reward choices significantly decreased across trials
(standardized β = –0.795; R2 = 0.632; F[1,12] = 20.65;
p < 0.001; regression analysis). This decrease was not
observed in any of the other blocks, –3, –2, 1, 2, and 3
(all F[1,12] < 0.45; all p > 0.52; regression analysis), in
which pigeons showed a highly consistent preference
bias. This suggests that block –1 was the only block in
which pigeons gradually shifted their preference from
the large to the small reward (Figure 2C). Because
block –1 was also the first block in which the delay
activity related to large-reward choices dropped below
the activity related to small-reward choices, we con-
clude that the difference between large- and small-
reward-related activity coincided with the time point of
the PS occurrence.
In conclusion, the neural discharge pattern was mod-
ulated by a combination of delay duration and reward
amount. We propose that this pattern resulted from the
Current Biology
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The mean filtered firing rate (mean peristimulus time histograms, bin size 25 ms, averaged across all trials per block and then smoothed with
a moving average filter, width of 4 bins) and raster plots are shown for one neuron during the first 1500 ms of the delay in the three blocks
preceding the PS ([A], large-reward choices) and three blocks following the PS ([B], small-reward choices). The horizontal dotted line marks
the averaged baseline spike rate (mean spikes per bin). The gray area delineates the window used for statistical analysis (see Figure 4A).
(A) This neuron exhibits the two characteristic response features typical of delay neurons: a short, phasic response with a latency of approxi-
mately 100 ms and a duration of approximately 100 ms and a long, sustained response with varying latency and a duration of at least 1000
ms. Spike rate during the sustained response was highest three blocks prior to the PS, where the delay was minimal and then decreased
across blocks –2 and –1 as the delay duration increased.
(B) The same neuron shows no systematic and block-dependent variation in discharge rate. (A) and (B) illustrate the delay dependence of
the neuron’s response rate: When the delay increases, the activity decreases, and when the delay is constant, the activity is constant, too.integration of delay and reward amount information
yielding a composite subjective reward value. More-
over, the difference between neural responses asso-
wciated with large-reward choices and small-reward
tchoices correlated with preference bias and time point
of PS occurrence. (Note: In this analysis, neural activa-
tion values were classified into blocks –3 and –1 in ses-
sions in which the PS occurred already after two o
blocks, and data in block –2 were considered missing.
However, exactly the same significance pattern was
found when neural data were assigned to block –2
w
and –1, with data in block –3 considered missing. Also,
o
the same significance pattern is found when sessions
E
are included in which the PS occurred after only one
t
block.)
r
f
dThe Neural Response Pattern Can Be Better
Approximated by a Hyperbolic Model t
athan by Linear or Exponential Models
For support of our conclusion, it is important to show o
nthat the hyperbolic model in Equation 1 is an adequate
approximation of the actual data, in contrast to more v
tsimple equations, such as a linear function or an expo-
nential function. We therefore contrasted two alterna- w
ative models with the hyperbolic model. We expected
that the observed neural data would be better ex- l
splained byV =
A
1 + gD
+ c (2)
hich adds a scaling constant c to Equation 1, than by
he linear function
V = gDA + c (3)
r by the exponential function
V = Ae(−gD) + c (4)
ith the same variable labels as in Equation 1. For each
f the 14 neurons, we individually fitted functions of
quations 2, 3, and 4 to the observed response magni-
ude values. The fit was done for each neuron sepa-
ately by feeding delay and reward-amount information
rom every relevant block into the equation. The indivi-
ual decay factor γ and the scaling constant c were
hen estimated for each function and each neuron with
least-square method to best fit the activation values
f that neuron. Figure 4C illustrates for an exemplar
euron that the hyperbolic and exponential models pro-
ided a better approximation of this neuron’s responses
han the linear model. To compare the goodness of fits,
e computed the Akaike information criterion (AIC)
cross all neurons and for each model. In general, the
ower the relative AIC value, the better the fit. Results
howed that for the given dataset, the hyperbolic
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599Figure 4. Single Neurons Encoding Delay Length (A) and Reward
Amount (B) and Model Predictions for an Exemplar Neuron (C)
(A). This figure shows the activation pattern, averaged across all 14
neurons of interest (± SEM). The solid line represents the magni-
tude of neural activation in relation to large-reward choices preced-
ing the PS, and the dotted line represents the neural activation in
relation to small-reward choices following the PS. As indicated in
Figure 3, the neural response magnitude significantly decreased
across the blocks preceding the PS when delay length increased,
and it remained roughly constant across the blocks that followed
the PS when delay duration was constant.
(B). This panel shows the neural activity in only those sessions in
which the delay in block –3 was 1.5 s (means ± SEM). The blank
block represents the activation magnitude in block –3 trials, and
the striped blocks represent the activation magnitudes in trials in
the post-PS blocks 1, 2, and 3. This figure thus compares trials
with equal delay durations (always 1.5 s delay in all blocks) but
different reward amounts (large in block –3 and small in blocks 1,model was clearly superior to both the linear and the
exponential model (AIChyperbolic = 97.9; AIClinear = 209.66;
and AICexponential = 270.63). This superiority suggests
that subjective reward value and neural firing rate were
both influenced by delay and reward amount in a hyper-
bolic fashion, as predicted by Equation 2 rather than by
Equation 3 or 4.
Discussion
Irrational Decision-Making and Impulsivity
Decision-making involves predicting and weighing the
consequences of each response alternative and then
selecting one of the alternatives on the basis of the
relative value of the predicted outcomes. Inconsistently
with assumptions made by many economic theories,
such as utility theory, humans and other animals often
do not make perfectly rational decisions aimed at opti-
mizing the expected outcomes. On the contrary, social,
biological, or emotional heuristics frequently bias deci-
sions toward apparently irrational strategies [24, 25].
Here, we show an example of a simple but prominent
irrational choice behavior: impulsive decision making—
that is, the preference for a small, immediate reward
over a large, delayed one. In our design, the total trial
duration was constant across all trials within a session
and independent of the animal’s choice. Choosing the
large reward on all trials would have therefore maxi-
mized the total amount of reward obtained per time and
session. Because the animals nevertheless switched to
the short-delayed small reward at some point during
the session, they displayed a suboptimal strategy that
resulted from the devaluation of temporally distant re-
wards. A similar behavioral bias has also been demon-
strated for humans [25, 26].
Single Neurons Integrate Reward Amount and Delay
Information to Encode the Subjective Reward Value
In the present study, we aimed to reveal the neural rep-
resentation of the subjective value of anticipated re-
wards as a function of temporal discount and reward
amount. We recorded activity of single forebrain units
in pigeons while the animals waited for the upcoming
rewards. By investigating the level of sustained neu-
ronal delay activity, we found single units that reduced
their activity with increasing delay durations, as pre-2, and 3). The response magnitude in block –3 was significantly
higher than the response magnitudes in the blocks following the
PS, indicating that in addition to delay length, the neurons also
encoded reward amount.
(C). The hyperbolic nature of the delay-dependent decay becomes
more evident when an exemplar single neuron is examined. The
dots and error bars represent the observed neural activations of
this neuron, the solid line represents the delay- and reward-depen-
dent subjective reward value as predicted by the hyperbolic model
in Equation 2, the dotted line accordingly represents the respective
data as predicted by the linear model in Equation 3, and the partly
dotted line represents the data as predicted by the exponential
model in Equation 4. The superiority of the hyperbolic and expo-
nential fits over the linear fit shows that Equations 2 and 4 provided
a better approximation to this neuron than Equation 3 did. For the
entire neural population, the hyperbolic model clearly provided the
best approximation.
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600dicted by our second hypothesis. Consistent with our p
first hypothesis, the same units did not show any sig- g
nificant activity variation when reward amount and de- u
lay-to-reward were held constant. Conversely, a com- W
parison of the activation magnitude in trials with equal a
delays but different reward amounts revealed that the o
same units were more active when the animal expected
a large rather than small reward amount, as predicted i
by our third hypothesis. This suggests that the delay 3
activity was modulated by a combination of anticipated r
delay duration and reward amount. Finally, the differ- m
ence in neural activation between large, delayed and N
small, immediate rewards correlated with the animal’s c
current preference bias and the time point of the prefer- i
ence shift: When the neural activity during anticipation o
of large rewards was significantly higher than or equal m
to the activity during anticipation of small rewards, the a
animals preferred the large, delayed reward. However, n
once the large-reward activity dropped below the l
small-reward activity, the PS was induced, and pigeons w
started preferring the small, immediate reward. s
Generally, preference for either of the two choice alter- a
natives depended on the subjective value of the antici- t
pated reward, which was a function of expected reward a
amount and waiting time. Examination of single-cell ac- p
tivity in this study thus showed that the neural re- e
sponses during reward anticipation were modulated by j
both delay duration and reward amount, as predicted w
by classical temporal-discounting behavioral laws [10– c
13] that link subjective reward value to preference be- t
havior. Although the subjective value of the anticipated p
reward is only one variable among others determining b
future choice behavior, we suggest that its representa- i
tion essentially contributes to evaluating response al- r
ternatives [3, 27–31].
As an alternative explanation to the subjective- A
reward-value hypothesis, the reported neural activation
a
pattern might merely be the consequence of a de-
W
crease in neural excitability over the course of a ses-
wsion—for example, as a measure of time lapse since
msession onset. This explanation, however, is unlikely
tbecause the units showed the activation decrease only
cbefore, but not after, the PS. In fact, there was a signifi-
icant activation increase between block –1 and 1 in the
fmiddle of a session—a phenomenon that is inconsis-
ttent with the assumption of a continuous reduction in
pexcitability. It is likewise inconceivable that the neurons
wtracked the time until, and scheduled the occurrence
aof, a habitual PS that developed for reasons other than
sthe successively increasing delay of the large reward.
(First, it is unclear why the pigeons should acquire and
nmaintain such a habit of systematically shifting their
cpreference because this shift has never been reinforced
[by our paradigm (owing to the fixed trial durations; see
tFigure 1). On the contrary, our design even discouraged
cthe establishment of a habitual PS because the re-
[ceived reward per time, trial, and session would be
tmaximal if no PS occurred. Hence, the only apparent
areason why pigeons nevertheless show the PS is the
tbenefit of reducing emotional distress associated with
vwaiting for the large reward. Second, the time point of
pthe PS varied largely within pigeons (see Table S1). If
Othe pigeons had developed a habit of shifting prefer-
ence after a particular amount of time, one would ex- iect a more temporally stable PS time point. Taken to-
ether, we find time-based arguments theoretically
nfounded and empirically inconsistent with our data.
e hence conclude that our interpretation of the neural
ctivity as a correlate of subjective reward value is the
nly plausible explanation for our results.
Numerous studies reported that prefrontal activation
n primates [16, 17, 27, 28, 32, 33] and humans [29, 34,
5] occurred during the delay between response and
eward, and therefore after the decision had been
ade. This is also what we found in the present study.
aturally, this activity might reflect (or at least be asso-
iated with) cortical correlates of the emotional arousal
nduced by reward expectation [3, 34, 36], perhaps in
rder to prepare the animal for goal-directed actions. A
ore cognitive explanation is provided by Montague
nd Berns [27], who extended the prediction-error sig-
al-learning theory by Schultz, Montague, and col-
eagues [28, 30] and gave a computational account of
hy postresponse activity may be important for sub-
equent decision-making. They proposed that delay
ctivity corresponded to the integration of qualita-
ively different entities—in the present study reward
mount and time-to-reward—to represent the antici-
ated choice consequence in an internal currency. This
nables an organism to continuously evaluate the sub-
ective value of the upcoming reward and decide
hether to stick with the current choice in the future or
hoose alternative response options. Whether these
wo accounts refer to the same or to different cortical
rocesses remains an open question. In any event, they
oth suggest that the animal needs a mechanism to
ntegrate reward amount and time-to-reward to avoid
esponse conflict and behave adaptively.
Neural Network for the Integration of Reward
nd Delay Information in Impulsive Choice Behavior
e suggest that information on time-to-reward and re-
ard amount is transformed into a common subjective
etric in order to guide future choice behavior. This in-
egration process is likely to take place in the frontal
ortex or analog avian structures, but where the to-be-
ntegrated information comes from and how the dif-
erent structures interact during decision-making need
o be investigated further. Evidence suggests that non-
rimary thalamic neurons encode information about re-
ard quality, reward amount, and time-to-reward [37]
nd feed this information into the brain’s reward-circuit
tructures, including amygdala, ventral tegmental area
VTA), cingulate cortex, lateral intraparietal area, perirhi-
al cortex, or nucleus accumbens (NAc), all of which
ommunicate at least indirectly with prefrontal areas
28, 30, 31, 38–40]. The basolateral amygdala (BLA) and
he NAc in particular appear to be key structures for
ontrolling impulsive choice behavior in both mammals
7, 9] and birds [41]. Whereas both structures are impor-
ant for maintaining the incentive value of a reward
cross a delay [7, 9], the BLA plays a role in updating
he current, but not the referential stimulus-reward
alue [42], and the NAc seems to encode temporal
roximity to reward delivery and reward amount [43].
ur results, in conjunction with the finding that lesions
n the rodent OFC decrease impulsive choice in a de-
Single Units Integrate Reward Amount and Delay
601layed-reward paradigm [9], suggest that fronto-striatal
and fronto-amygdaloid loops are essential for updating
the subjective reward value with increasing delays.
Conclusions
In this study, we have shown that the reward-anticipat-
ing activity of single forebrain neurons is modulated by
a combination of delay duration and reward amount.
We argue that this compound is a correlate of the sub-
jective reward value and plays a role in biasing the ani-
mal’s preference to either stay with the large, delayed
reward or switch to the immediate, small reward. Ab-
normally high weighting of the time component during
this integration process might lead to an accelerated
temporal discount of reward value or a reduced delay
tolerance, resulting in inappropriate impulsive decision-
making—a short-sighted, irrational choice behavior
that is typical for neuropathologies such as addictive
gambling, drug abuse, attention-deficit disorder, and
frontal lobe syndrome.
Experimental Procedures
Task
The task is illustrated in Figure 1 and described in greater detail in
the Supplemental Data.
Electrophysiological Recordings
Eight pigeons were prepared for extracellular single-cell recordings
in awake, freely moving animals with a procedure described else-
where [44, 45]. One microdrive per animal was chronically im-
planted at a lateral position within the borders of NCL, as defined
by Kröner and Gu¨ntu¨rku¨n [20]. The tips of the electrodes were in-
serted to reach the following coordinates (all dorsal-ventral coordi-
nates in relation to brain surface and according to the pigeon brain
atlas by Karten and Hodos [46]): A 4.5–6.5, L 7.5, and D 1.0–3.0.
Each microdrive housed eight 25 m formvar-coated nichrome
wires. In each session, only two of the eight wires were used for
recording. Neural activity was measured from the difference be-
tween one of the wires carrying a neural signal versus another wire,
which served as the indifferent electrode, with minimal activity. Al-
though sometimes several wires carried neural signals within a re-
cording session, only one of these wires was used for recording,
and after the session, the microdrive was advanced to exclude
double recording from the same unit. Every weekday and in each
pigeon, the electrodes were advanced by 40 m, even when no
recording took place, and the animal was returned to its homecage.
The next recording session started at least 14 hr after advancement
of the electrode to allow the compressed brain tissue to expand
and ensure stable recordings. In six of the eight pigeons, the im-
plants were removed after 6 weeks of recording and reimplanted in
the opposite hemisphere. The minimum signal-to-noise ratio was
2:1; however, 113 of 159 neurons had a signal-to-noise ratio of 3:1
or higher. The average signal-to-noise ratio was 3.67:1.
During recording, the signals were continuously monitored with
an oscilloscope and a speaker. All signals were first impedance
matched through a field effect transistor (FET) headstage, amplified
and filtered online, and stored on computer with standard CED am-
plifiers, AD converters, and Spike2 software (Cambridge Electronic
Design, United Kingdom, 1401 plus system).
All subjects were kept and treated according to the University of
Otago Code of Ethical Conduct for the Manipulation of Animals,
and the research was approved by the University of Otago Animal
Ethics Committee.
Data Analysis
Task-related activity was determined with paired t tests to test for
a difference between delay and baseline activity (spikes/s). For the
further analysis of units with sustained delay activity, only the three
sessions preceding and following the PS were examined, and onlylarge-reward choices before and small-reward choices after the PS
were selected. For each trial, the ranked percent change in delay
in relation to baseline activity was computed as the measure of
activation magnitude, and the response pattern was evaluated with
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For details on the data analysis, refer
to the Supplemental Data.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Results and Discussion, detailed Experimental Pro-
cedures, two supplemental figures, and two supplemental tables
are available at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/
15/7/594/DC1/.
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